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Abstract 
Between 1988 and 1993, the Belgian personal income tax system and the indirect tax system were 
reformed to a considerable extent. We use microsimulation models to investigate the impact of the 
reform on the liability progression and the redistributive effect of the combined tax system. The 
redistributive effect of personal income taxes decreased, notwithstanding an increase in liability 
progression. For indirect taxes, both the liability regressivity and the reverse redistributive effect 
have been enhanced. We use recently developed statistical tests to gauge the significance of the 
observed changes. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Between 1988 and 1993, the Belgian personal income tax (PIT) system was 
reformed to a considerable extent. Major elements of this reform were the 
reductions of the top rates, broadening of the tax base and a move from joint 
taxation in the direction of individual taxation. The whole set of measures 
implied a tax cut. The revenue loss was partly compensated by an increase in 
indirect taxes over the period 1988–93. Simulations show that, despite the 
increase in indirect taxes, global tax revenue decreased by 4 per cent (see 
Decoster et al. (1998, p. 65)). The PIT reform, in combination with the reform in 
the indirect tax system, also led to a change in the mix of both instruments. In 
1988, PIT made up 57.8 per cent of the joint PIT and indirect tax revenue. But its 
share decreased to 53.8 per cent in 1993.
1 
The Belgian PIT reform was very much in line with the Tax Reform Act of 
1986 in the US (TRA86), and hence with the type of income tax reform that 
swept the western countries over a decade ago.
2 The shift in the direction of 
indirect taxes seems much less common. Although such a shift has been 
advocated in several other countries, the UK seems to be one of the rare 
exceptions where it really has been implemented.
3 Therefore we document both 
reforms separately, and also their joint impact, in this paper. 
While one might expect that the increased reliance on indirect taxes implies a 
regressive move, the impact of the PIT reform and consequently of the global tax 
reform is much less clear. Indeed, the reduction of the top rates and base-
broadening have opposite effects on the tax liabilities to be paid after the reform. 
Moreover, in the aftermath of TRA86, much attention has been devoted to 
judging the impact of the PIT reform in the US, and these studies tend to come 
up with mixed evidence. Some argue that the reform increased progressivity, 
while others say it went down.
4 
As it turns out, the conclusions about TRA86 tend to depend on the 
progressivity concept that is used, on a number of data issues such as the exact 
tax concept, the income concept and the use of equivalence scales, and on 
modelling assumptions, of which the assumptions about behavioural reactions 
seem to be the more important ones. Moreover, most studies do not take to heart 
the recommendation of Bishop et al. (1997) to use statistical tools that check the 
significance of the changes in progressivity measures. Finally, these TRA86 
                                                                                                                                    
1These shares are also based on the results of simulations in Decoster et al. (1998). 
2See Messere (1998, pp. 10–12) and Sommerhalder (1992). 
3See Messere (1998, p. 8) and Giles and Johnson (1994). 
4The general expectation at the time of the reform was that TRA86 would increase progressivity (see Pechman 
(1987)), although the policy proposals themselves mentioned distributional neutrality (see the quote in McLure 
and Zodrow (1987)). Indeed, many studies found that the reform enhanced progressivity. For a recent survey of 
a broad range of studies, see Auerbach and Slemrod (1997) and the references therein. Yet the number of 
studies that conclude that TRA86 decreased progressivity is not negligible (for example, see Bishop et al. 
(1997)). Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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studies use different datasets for the pre- and post-reform situation (namely, 
datasets preceding 1986 and datasets from after 1986). This brings in different 
pre-tax income distributions, which, of course, are relevant if the objective is an 
evaluation of the overall change in the after-tax income distribution. But if the 
sole concern is to separate out the impact of the tax reform itself, these different 
pre-tax distributions do more harm than good. 
In this paper, we try to avoid many of these pitfalls. The reform under study 
is the 1988 PIT reform in Belgium, followed by indirect tax increases up to 
1993. The use of microsimulation methodology allows us to keep the pre-tax 
income distribution fixed by calculating the tax liabilities of the 1988 and 1993 
systems on the same dataset. By holding everything else constant (for example, 
changes in primary incomes), we can focus exclusively on the policy change of 
interest. The simulations are carried out by means of two different 
microsimulation models, one for PIT and one for indirect taxes. These models 
run on two different underlying datasets, but we combine the simulated tax 
liabilities into one single dataset with the aid of a statistical matching technique. 
Our aim is to sketch the impact of the tax reform on the redistributive power 
of the system. A quick plunge into the literature shows how manifold are the 
meanings attached to the term ‘redistributive’. Especially in the vulgarising 
papers and publications, the distinction between ‘redistribution’ and 
‘progressivity’ is often lost from sight.
5 The basic distinction is between the 
change in the after-tax income distribution, produced by the tax system, and the 
disproportionality of the tax system, measured as the deviation of the distribution 
of tax shares from the shares obtained from an equal-yield proportional tax. 
Following Lambert (1993), we call the first concept ‘redistributive effect’ and 
the second ‘liability progression’. 
The Reynolds–Smolensky index and the Kakwani index respectively are one 
set of possible indices to summarise these two characteristics of a tax system, 
and the relation between the two is well understood. In this paper, we present 
these indices and their standard errors, for PIT, indirect taxes and the global 
system before and after the reform. But our micro-data also allow us to go 
further. In addition to the indices themselves, we provide the detailed Lorenz and 
concentration curves underlying them. This not only gives a more detailed 
picture of the effect of the tax reform through the income scale. The main 
advantage lies in bypassing the choice of specific aggregation procedures, 
unavoidably associated with index values. In this, we follow the approach 
fruitfully applied by Bishop et al. (1997) for TRA86. Moreover, some recently 
                                                                                                                                    
5Many policy proposals contain prescriptions such as ‘designing the tax reform as distributionally neutral’, 
notwithstanding the lack of a precise description of what is meant by this. TRA86, however, is one of the rare 
exceptions that did specify this distributional neutrality — namely, as equal percentage reductions in tax 
liabilities at all income levels (see McLure and Zodrow (1987, p. 44)). Clearly, this refers to keeping the 
liability progression constant. Fiscal Studies 
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published papers provide the tools to take into account the importance of the 
sampling errors when Lorenz and concentration curves are compared.
6 
In Section II, we discuss the simulated reforms. Section III deals with the data 
and the simulation models that have been used. The methodology to measure the 
redistributive effect and the liability progression is summarised in Section IV 
and empirically applied to the Belgian tax reform in Section V. Section VI 
concludes. 
II. THE SIMULATED TAX REFORMS 
1. The Reform of the Personal Income Tax System
7 
The first major element of the tax reform was ‘base-broadening’. Many 
deductions, applied to gross income, were discarded and replaced by tax credits. 
Therefore the concept of ‘taxable income’ was altered significantly by the 
reform. The reform also tightened the possibilities for deducting costs from 
professional income, such as expenses on visiting restaurants and on professional 
clothing. Before the reform, expenses on life insurance contracts were treated 
partly as a deduction and partly as a tax credit, while, after the reform, they are 
treated entirely as a tax credit. This change has led to a less favourable treatment 
of life insurance contracts in the tax system after the reform. In the 1988 PIT 
system, capital redemptions due to mortgage loans, payments to group insurance 
contracts and contributions to private pension funds could be deducted. The 
1993 PIT system uses tax credits instead of a deduction in all these cases. The 
reform also installed a more generous deduction for charity gifts, and some 
expenses for childcare could be deducted after the reform but not before. In 
general, however, the deduction possibilities are more restricted after the reform. 
Second, taxable income was imported into different tax schemes before and 
after the reform. Three major differences can be distinguished: 
•  A thorough restructuring of tax rates — broader and fewer brackets, lower 
marginal tariffs at the top. 
•  The zero-rate bracket, applied before the reform, was abolished. After the 
reform, basic allowances were installed to compensate for family structure 
(for example, spouse and dependent children). 
                                                                                                                                    
6See Bishop, Chow and Formby (1994) and Davidson and Duclos (1997). 
7We sketch the major differences between the 1988 and 1993 PIT systems. Hence, so to speak, the reform 
refers to all the measures that have been implemented between 1988 and 1993, although they have not been 
realised by a single tax reform act. Note that if we refer to 1988 or 1993 for the PIT system, this implies 
reference to the administrative tax years 1989 or 1994 respectively. Although we do not consider the benefit 
part of the disposable income generation process, we do, of course, take into account any change in the tax 
treatment of replacement incomes and benefits. Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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•  Full separate taxation of the main income earned by spouses (labour income, 
unemployment benefits, pensions, etc.) after the reform. 
The reform has reduced the number of tax brackets from 14 to seven. The 
changes for higher income levels are especially striking. Before the reform, four 
different rates, ranging from 56.5 per cent to 70.8 per cent, were applied on 
income above BEF 1,574,000. After the reform, these income levels only face 
rates of 52.5 per cent or 55 per cent. 
Before the reform, the first bracket of the scheme (up to BEF 120,000) was a 
zero-rate bracket and dependent children entitled the taxpayer to tax credits. The 
reform substituted ‘exemptions from the bottom up’ for the zero-rate bracket.
8 
This basic allowance varies with household composition (i.e. by marital status 
and whether there are dependent children). In 1993, it amounted to BEF 186,000 
for a single person and BEF 146,000 for each partner of a married couple. 
Dependent children pushed the exemption level up by BEF 39,000, BEF 62,000, 
BEF 127,000 and BEF 141,000 for the first, second, third and fourth child 
respectively. 
Full separate taxation of professional income and the creation of the 
‘marriage fraction’ for spouses was one of the core elements of the PIT reform. 
Before the reform, a rather low joint income ceiling determined whether the 
professional income of a two-income-earner family was taxed jointly or 
separately. Above the threshold, joint taxation was the rule, which, in a 
progressive system, could lead to a large discrepancy in the amount of taxes paid 
by a married couple as compared with a cohabiting, but non-married, couple. To 
cope with this problem, the new system attributes to each partner the income 
components that are associated with his or her own professional activity. This 
separate income concept covers wages and salaries paid to employees but also 
replacement incomes, such as unemployment benefits and retirement pensions. 
Other sources of income, such as real estate income or income from movable 
property, are still attributed to the partner with the highest amount of 
professional income. To compensate families with only one income earner for 
this ‘favourable’ tax treatment of double-income families, the system of 
‘marriage fraction’, designed to cope with unequally distributed household 
income, was continued and enlarged. If one of the spouses earns less than 30 per 
cent of the total amount of professional income of the couple, this partner is 
                                                                                                                                    
8The description ‘exemptions from the bottom up’ has been used in official texts in Belgium to distinguish this 
basic allowance from ordinary exemptions and deductions on the one hand, and credits on the other hand. 
Ordinary exemptions and deductions lead to a reduction in the tax liability, which is determined by the 
marginal tax rate (hence ‘at the top’). Exemptions ‘from the bottom up’ determine a tax credit by calculating 
the tax liability on this exempted income, starting with the lowest marginal rates first (hence ‘from the bottom 
up’). This tax credit is then subtracted from the tax liability obtained from the taxation of the taxable income 
without the exemption. Fiscal Studies 
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attributed an amount as if he or she had earned this 30 per cent.
9 The income of 
the other partner is reduced by this amount. This reshuffling of taxable income 
among spouses was limited to BEF 297,000 in the 1993 PIT system. 
2. The Reform of the Indirect Tax System 
The main change in the indirect tax system took place in April 1992. This reform 
was intended to bring the Belgian indirect tax system more into line with EC 
recommendations that prescribed a normal rate of at least 15 per cent and one or 
two rates of at least 5 per cent. Before the reform, seven different VAT rates 
were applied (0, 1, 6, 17, 19, 25 and 33 per cent). The newly installed 
government decided to drop the 17, 25 and 33 per cent rates. The normal rate 
became 19.5 per cent. The reduced rate of 6 per cent was maintained and a 
second reduced rate, of 12 per cent, was introduced. Hence five different VAT 
rates still applied after the reform (0, 1, 6, 12 and 19.5 per cent). 
To compensate for the decrease in the VAT rate on road fuels, excises on 
these products were simultaneously increased. This increase in excises was only 
one step of a continuous increase in excise taxation on these products during the 
period of investigation. Per litre of petrol, the consumer paid an excise of   
BEF 11.2 in 1988 and BEF 18.45 in 1993. For diesel, the figures are respectively 
BEF 5.25 in 1988 and BEF 11.33 in 1993. The same continuous increase in 
excise holds, to a lesser extent, for cigarettes, although in this case it has been 
offset partially by a decrease in the ad valorem tax. The excises on most other 
products remained constant throughout the studied period, which implies an 
effective decrease in tax burden. By means of the microsimulation model for 
indirect taxes described in the next section, we have calculated the impact of 
these changes on consumer prices, under the assumption of fixed producer 
prices. The consumer prices of petrol, diesel and tobacco products increase 
substantially, by 31 per cent, 39 per cent and 12 per cent respectively. The 
abolition of the 33 per cent and 25 per cent VAT rates shows up in a price 
decrease for durables of 3 per cent. 
III. THE DATA AND SIMULATION OF THE REFORMS 
We use two different microsimulation models, with different datasets, to 
simulate the PIT reform and the indirect tax reform. We combine these datasets 
using a statistical matching procedure, to end up with a single dataset that can be 
used to evaluate both reforms. 
Personal income taxes are simulated with the microsimulation model, SIRe, 
which uses a sample of administrative data.
10 This sample, referred to as IPCAL, 
                                                                                                                                    
9Note that this system also applies for two-income-earner families if the marriage fraction produces a lower tax 
liability than separate taxation does. 
10See Standaert and Valenduc (1996) for more information on SIRe. Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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consists of 10,343 tax returns filed in 1994.
11 As a consequence, the units of 
observation are administrative units. In principle, these units are individuals, 
since each Belgian citizen who gains a sufficient amount of income has to file a 
tax return separately. However, married couples file only one tax return. People 
with income below some threshold do not have to file a tax return.
12 Therefore 
the sample is not representative of the whole population. 
Both the 1988 and 1993 PIT systems have been simulated on the same 
dataset.
13 Since no behavioural responses were available in SIRe, gross income is 
kept constant between 1988 and 1993. 
The indirect tax reforms are simulated with the microsimulation model, 
ASTER.
14 The basic dataset of this model is a household budget survey that 
covers 3,235 households and has been designed as a representative sample of all 
households living in Belgium. A household is defined as all people living under 
the same roof, using the same accommodation and deciding their expenditures 
commonly. The households in the survey have been asked to register their 
expenditures between May 1987 and May 1988. Besides the very detailed 
expenditures at the household level, the budget survey also contains information 
on labour income and most social security benefits of the individual household 
members. However, since all income information in the budget survey is net of 
taxes, it was not possible to simulate the PIT reform on this dataset. Hence we 
only used the budget survey to simulate the indirect tax liabilities before and 
after the reform of the indirect tax system. The detailed demand system available 
in ASTER allowed us to take account of behavioural reactions to the change in 
relative prices, and real income. The total amount of household expenditure was 
kept constant for the simulation.
15 
A major problem arises because the datasets have different units of 
observation. The budget survey contains households. IPCAL is a set of 
administrative units. Since the information needed to combine these 
administrative units in IPCAL into households is not available, households in the 
budget survey are first split into administrative units, similar to those used in 
IPCAL. To do this, we apply the administrative rules to the information that is 
                                                                                                                                    
11Hence the reported income figures are expressed in 1993 prices. 
12For some people, such as those receiving only replacement income, it is obvious that they will not have to pay 
income taxes. After a number of years, these people no longer receive a tax form from the administration. They 
only have to contact the administration if their income condition has changed. The parameters of the tax system 
(and hence the rules used by the administration) determining which people do not receive a tax form did not 
change in the period under consideration. 
13To express nominal figures in the tax legislation of both systems at the same level, we used the change in the 
consumption price index. This index increased from 100 to 115.8 between 1988 and 1993. See Ministerie van 
Financiën (1994, p. IV.4). Between 1988 and 1993, the important parameters of the tax system, such as 
brackets, allowances and deductions, were fully indexed. 
14See Decoster (1995) and Decoster, Delhaye and Van Camp (1996) for more information on ASTER. 
15This amounts to assuming that the change in disposable income caused by the PIT reform is completely 
absorbed into savings. Fiscal Studies 
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available in the budget survey. We then inflate the nominal variables in this 
disentangled budget survey, to make the levels comparable to those observed in 
IPCAL.
16 Since the adapted budget survey and IPCAL have a number of 
variables in common, we can establish a link between the two datasets by 
minimising a distance function over these common variables. In Decoster et al. 
(1998) and Decoster and Van Camp (2000a), we describe how we have applied a 
statistical matching technique to combine the datasets.
17 With the aid of this link, 
we can transfer the simulated PIT liabilities from IPCAL to the disentangled 
budget survey. Then simply summing the PIT liabilities of all administrative 
units within a single household results in PIT liabilities expressed at the 
household level. Hence, after this operation, we dispose of PIT and indirect tax 
liabilities for all households in the budget survey, both before and after the 
reform. 
IV. MEASUREMENT OF THE REDISTRIBUTIVE EFFECT AND OF 
LIABILITY PROGRESSION 
To provide insight into the operation of the different tax systems, we compare 
distributions realised under the actual tax system with those that would be 
achieved under an equal-yield proportional tax. It is common practice to 
implement this idea with the aid of the Lorenz curve of pre-tax incomes and 
concentration curves of post-tax incomes and tax liabilities.
18 This approach 
provides an intuitive view of the impact of the different tax systems. Moreover, 
statistical tools to test whether or not these curves differ significantly are directly 
available. 
1. Definition of the IR(p)- and TR(p)-Curves 
To measure the redistribution of after-tax incomes caused by the non-
proportional system in comparison with the proportional one, one compares the 
ordinates of the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income, X, with those of the 
concentration curve of post-tax income, M (= X–T, where T is the tax liability). 
This comparison reveals how the post-tax income shares of the actual tax system 
are distributed, compared with those of the proportional tax system. We capture 
this difference between the two ordinates at a given quantile, p, by IR(p).
19 
                                                                                                                                    
16The factor we use to inflate these figures is 1.404, which captures the nominal growth of national income in 
the National Accounts between 1987–88 and 1993. 
17On statistical matching, see, for example, Rodgers (1984). 
18See, among others, Kakwani (1986), Pfähler (1987), Duclos (1993), Lambert (1993, Ch. 7) and Bishop et al. 
(1997). In this section, we only assemble the elements from this literature that are relevant for the empirical 
section. Our notation follows Lambert (1993) quite closely. 
19The exact definition of IR(p) is the ordinate of the concentration curve of post-tax income minus the ordinate 
of the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income. Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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Figure 1 illustrates the three curves. The measure IR(p) can be interpreted as the 
fraction of post-tax income that is shifted from high incomes (the top 100(1–p) 
per cent) to low incomes (the bottom 100p per cent) because of the 
disproportionality of the tax system. 
FIGURE 1 
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To end up with a single index value for the redistributive effect, it is common 
practice to aggregate IR(p)-values over the p-range of quantiles. Best known in 
this case is the index proposed by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), which equals 
twice the difference between the two curves in the upper panel of Figure 1. We 
denote this index of redistribution by 
RS Π . 
Of course, producing an aggregate index of the redistributive effect comes at 
a price, and 
RS Π  is to the IR(p)-curve as the Gini coefficient is to the Lorenz 
curve: detail is lost and eventually more general dominance results are forgone in 
the process of aggregation. Therefore we present not only the index 
RS Π  (in 
Section V(1)) but also the IR(p)-curve itself (in Section V(2)).
20 
The redistribution of post-tax income captured by IR(p) and 
RS Π  is 
ultimately based on the disproportionality of the tax liabilities. Hence, 
alternatively, one can also focus on the concentration curve of these tax 
liabilities. The comparison of the tax concentration curve and the Lorenz curve 
for pre-tax income yields the difference between the tax shares of the actual tax 
system and those of the proportional tax system. Similarly to the IR(p)-curve, we 
have defined the measure TR(p) to record this difference. The TR(p)-curve is to 
be interpreted as the fraction of the total tax burden that is shifted from low 
incomes (the bottom 100p per cent) to high incomes (the top 100(1–p) per cent) 
because of the disproportionality of the actual tax system.
21 
Integration of TR(p) over the p-range now yields the Kakwani (1977) index of 
liability progression, which is twice the area under the TR(p)-curve. We denote it 
by 
K Π . In Section V(1), we present the 
K Π -indices before and after the reform; 
in Section V(3), we sketch the TR(p)-curves to investigate the dominance 
character of the results. 
It is well known that IR(p) and TR(p), and hence 
RS Π  and 
K Π , are intimately 
related by means of the average tax rate, t, in the following way:
22 
(1)  () ()
1
t





                                                                                                                                    
20Since IR(p) is a comparison between a post-tax and a pre-tax distribution, it might also be interpreted as the 
change in post-tax income inequality because of taxation. However, if there is reranking, it is well known that 
IR(p) provides a biased estimate of this change in inequality. See, for example, Lambert (1993, p. 185). 
Reranking can be captured as the difference between the post-tax income concentration curve and the post-
tax income Lorenz curve (see Duclos (1993, p. 353) and Duclos (2000) for a possible interpretation of this 
reranking measure). We could never reject the hypothesis that this difference is equal to zero (see Decoster and 
Van Camp (2000b)). Therefore we can also use the IR(p)-values to judge the impact of the different tax reforms 
on inequality of post-tax incomes. 
21The exact definition of TR(p) is the ordinate of the Lorenz curve of pre-tax income minus the ordinate of the 
concentration curve tax liabilities. In a progressive system, the lower income groups bear a share of the total tax 
receipts that is smaller than their share in taxable income. Hence the TR(p)-values for a progressive system are 
positive. 
22See Lambert (1993, pp. 183–4) Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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Both equations (1) and (2) reveal the importance of the average tax rate, t, in the 
transformation of liability progression into the redistributive effect. Hence, in the 
evaluation of a single tax system, both measures will show up with the same 
sign. But if the values are compared over tax systems with different average tax 
rates (for example, before and after a non-revenue-neutral tax reform), it is 
perfectly possible for IR(p) to decrease while TR(p) increases. The same holds, 
of course, for 
RS Π  and 
K Π .
23 
2. Estimation of and Statistical Inference on Curves and Indices 
We write  ; () XX Lp  to denote the ordinate of the Lorenz curve at quantile p. The 
first subscript of  .;.() Lp  refers to the variable that is used to order the data in 
ascending order. The second subscript refers to the variable of analysis. F(x) 
refers to the cumulative distribution function of the variable X, so that quantile p 
is defined by p = F(y). 
The ordinates of the Lorenz and concentration curves are estimated as the 
fraction of two sums. The following equation gives the expression for the 
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In these equations, n is the sample size,  i w  refers to the sample weight of 
observation i and  ˆ [0, ]() y Ii  is an indicator function. Estimated values are denoted 
by  . ˆ. Similar estimators for the concentration curves  ; () XT Lp  and  ; () XM Lp  are 
obtained if one replaces pre-tax income,  i x , in equation (3) with tax liability,  i t , 
                                                                                                                                    
23See Formby, Smith and Thistle (1990) and Silber (1994) on this point. Fiscal Studies 
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and post-tax income,  i m , respectively. Finally, if one substitutes m for x and the 
distribution function for post-tax income, G, for the one for pre-tax income, F, in 
equations (3) and (4), one obtains an estimator for the Lorenz curve,  ; () MM Lp . 
We obtain an estimate of the curves as a whole by combining a number of 
ordinates, estimated for different values of p. Beach and Davidson (1983) 
derived that, asymptotically, vectors of such estimators are multivariate normally 
distributed. Davidson and Duclos (1997) extended these results for vectors with 
differences between two dependent ordinate estimators, as is required for 
differences between estimators of Lorenz and concentration curves.
24 They 
proved that such vectors have an asymptotically multivariate normal distribution 
as well and gave an expression for the asymptotic covariance matrix. All 
elements of the covariance matrix are estimated straightforwardly from the 
expressions they provided.
25 
Since there is no obvious criterion to select the population shares for which to 
estimate ordinates, any choice is arbitrary. We estimate the ordinates 
corresponding to decile population shares. Our joint null hypothesis is that two 
curves do not differ. We follow Bishop, Chakraborti and Thistle (1989) by 
testing this joint null hypothesis through sub null hypotheses at each estimated 
point of the curve. Hence, with 10 deciles, we build our joint hypothesis on nine 
sub null hypotheses. If at least one of these sub null hypotheses is rejected, the 
joint null hypothesis of no significant difference between the curves is also 
rejected. 
Contrary to the approach in Beach and Davidson (1983), where one single 
test decides on the rejection or not of the joint null hypothesis, our approach 
through several sub null hypotheses allows us to distinguish between several 
alternatives: positive dominance, negative dominance and crossing of the curves. 
We conclude that there is positive dominance if we reject a sub null hypothesis 
at at least one point and if all significant differences are positive. Conversely, we 
conclude that there is negative dominance if there is a significant difference at at 
least one point and if all significant differences are negative. If we observe 
                                                                                                                                    
24Bishop, Chow and Formby (1994) provide similar theorems, but they do not give an explicit expression for 
the elements of the covariance matrix, which makes their results less accessible for empirical implementation. 
25Davidson and Duclos (1997) suggested estimating the quantile values within the covariance matrix, such as 
E( | ( )) YZ Gp = , with the aid of a Kernel estimator. This is done only when the quantile values  of 
concentration curves are estimated. We use a Gaussian Kernel and determine the band width by means of 
expression 3.28 on page 45 of Silverman (1986). 
The use of the Kernel estimator only to estimate the quantile values of concentration curves, and not for the 
values of the ordinates of the curves nor for the Lorenz curves, is, besides the appeal of simplicity, based on at 
least two other arguments. First, it reflects the fact that the ordering variable (for example, Z) and the variable 
of analysis (for example, Y) converge differently from their true value. Second, one may assume that there is 
more uncertainty when a point value has to be estimated (as is the case for a quantile value) instead of a sum of 
these points (as is the case when ordinates are estimated). Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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significant positive differences at some points and significant negative 
differences at other points, we conclude that curves are crossing. 
In order to test our joint null hypothesis, we need appropriate significance 
levels at each of the points where a sub null hypothesis is tested. Indeed, 
choosing a 5 per cent significance level for each test of a sub null hypothesis 
leads to a significance level of more than 5 per cent for the joint test. Denoting 
the significance level of each of the sub null hypothesis tests by α  and the 
number of sub null hypotheses by k, the joint significance level equals 
1( 1 )
k k α −− , which is smaller than α . Hence, to maintain the significance 
level at 5 per cent for the joint test, we need to take critical values from the joint 
distribution of the estimates. In this case, this amounts to the multivariate 
analogue of student t — the student maximum modulus (SMM) distribution — 
and we have to select the critical value corresponding to the number of sub null 
hypotheses in the joint test. For three, six, 10, 15 and even more sub null 
hypotheses, critical values for the SMM distribution are available in Stoline and 
Ury (1979). For numbers of sub null hypotheses in between these values, one 
cannot retrieve the critical values from their tables. Some authors (for example, 
Bishop, Chow and Formby (1994)) have solved this problem by linearly 
interpolating between the critical values listed in Stoline and Ury (1979). An 
alternative approach consists of constructing Bonferroni t-intervals: divide the 
significance level required for the joint test, α , by the number of sub null 
hypotheses to be tested and retrieve the critical values from the univariate 
distribution of each of the individual estimates. Since 1( 1 )
k k αα −− < , this 
approach is more conservative than using the values of the SMM distribution. 
Hence the significance level of the joint test is smaller than the joint significance 
level one originally aims at. The joint null hypothesis of no difference between 
the two curves will be rejected less often. 
We have nine sub null hypotheses, which is a missing value in Stoline and 
Ury (1979). Since we prefer a more conservative test rather than linear 
interpolation of the critical values, we construct Bonferroni t-intervals. We 
choose α  equal to 5 per cent. The critical value for a two-sided test with nine 
sub null hypotheses and infinite degrees of freedom is then 2.78.
26 
For the aggregate indices (Reynolds–Smolensky and Kakwani) and their 
corresponding standard errors, we have the choice between two approaches: 
either use the nine estimates of the ordinates of the Lorenz and concentration 
curves, or use all observations in the sample. Duclos (1997) showed that these 
aggregate indices and the corresponding standard errors can be derived from the 
ordinate estimates. But this entails a loss of information, compared with 
                                                                                                                                    
26See Seber (1977, p. 131, Table 5.1). Fiscal Studies 
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procedures that use all observations in the sample. Therefore we follow Bishop, 
Formby and Zheng (1998), who demonstrated the asymptotic normality of 
Reynolds–Smolensky and Kakwani indices and provided expressions that use all 
sample values to determine the standard errors of these indices. 
V. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We order households on the basis of equivalised pre-tax income. This is 
constructed as the sum of 
B
i DI , the disposable income of household i as 
recorded in the budget survey, and 
B
i PIT , the PIT liability of household i paid 
before the PIT reform.
27 We use the superscript B to denote the situation before 
the reform and a superscript A for the situation after the reform. To equivalise, 
we use the OECD equivalence scale.
28 The tax liabilities are also equivalised. 
1. Aggregate Measures of the Redistributive Effect and of Liability Progression 
Table 1 presents the Reynolds–Smolensky measures of the respective tax 
systems. Not surprisingly, the PIT system shifts, on average, post-tax income 
from top to bottom, while the reverse is true for the indirect tax system. This 
holds both before and after the reform. The PIT system being quantitatively more 
important than the indirect tax system (see Table 2 for the average tax rates), the 
combined tax system also shifts post-tax income from top to bottom before and 
after the reform. Yet the reform reduced the positive value of the Reynolds–
Smolensky for PIT and it increased (in absolute value) the negative value of this 
index for the indirect tax system. Consequently, the reform eroded the 
redistributive effect of the combined system. The standard errors, presented in  
Table 1, indicate that the index values and the changes induced by the reform are 
all statistically different from zero.
29 
Equation (2) clearly shows the two basic components of the redistributive 
effect of a tax system: the interplay of the average tax rate (given in Table 2) and 
liability progression. The latter is presented in the form of the Kakwani index in 
Table 3. Since the average tax rate is always positive, the Kakwani index appears 
with the same sign as the redistributive effect in Table 1. Personal income taxes  
 
                                                                                                                                    
27We do not use the pre-tax income concept from the fiscal dataset IPCAL, since some relevant income 
components, such as family allowances, are not taxed and thus not available in IPCAL. Disposable income in 
the budget survey covers all household income components, including transfers and non-earned income. Our 
equivalised pre-tax income is therefore different from gross market income. 
28In this scale, the first adult is given a value of 1, each subsequent adult gets a weight of 0.7 and each child 
counts for 0.5. One is considered a child until the age of 13. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility that 
our results are sensitive to the choice of the scale. 
29A two-sided test with α  = 0.05 has been applied, the critical value being 
0.025 t∞  = 1.96. Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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TABLE 1 
Reynolds–Smolensky Measures for PIT, Indirect and Global Tax Systems 
  Personal income taxes  Indirect taxes  Global taxes 
Redistributive effect 







      
Redistributive effect 







      
Change in the 
redistributive effect 







Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
TABLE 2 
Average Tax Rates 
  Personal income taxes  Indirect taxes  Global taxes 
Before the reform  0.2264  0.0766  0.3030 
After the reform  0.2108  0.0804  0.2912 
Change –0.0156  0.0038  –0.0118 
 
TABLE 3 
Kakwani Indices for PIT, Indirect and Global Tax Systems 
  Personal income taxes  Indirect taxes  Global taxes 
Liability progression 







      
Liability progression 







      
Change in the 
liability progression 







Note: Standard errors are given in parentheses. 
 
and the combined system are liability progressive. The indirect tax system is 
regressive. This holds both before and after the reform. But, due to changes in 
average tax rates, the reform can result in opposite changes in the Kakwani and 
Reynolds–Smolensky measures. For PIT, this is indeed the case. Since the 
liability progression of PIT has been increased by the reform, the erosion of the Fiscal Studies 
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redistributive effect of PIT is entirely due to the lower average tax rate. For 
indirect taxes, both liability regressivity and the average tax rate increased, 
leading to an enhancement of the negative redistributive effect. Also, the 
Kakwani indices, and the changes therein because of the reform, are found to be 
statistically different from zero. 
These figures contradict the common opinion that the Belgian tax reform of 
the 1980s reduced redistribution because personal income taxes became less 
progressive. The reform did indeed lead to a smaller redistributive effect, but this 
occurred notwithstanding the increased liability progression of PIT. The erosion 
of the redistributive effect of the global system is due to a combination of two 
factors: on the one hand, the reduction of the tax rate of the progressive PIT; on 
the other hand, the increased reliance on the regressive indirect tax system, 
which became still more regressive because of the reform. 
The Reynolds–Smolensky and Kakwani indices are one specific way of 
aggregating the underlying IR(p)- and TR(p)-values. Looking at the curves 
themselves not only gives a much more detailed picture of what is happening at 
different points of the income distribution, but also allows us to test whether the 
above conclusions are robust with respect to the specific aggregation procedures. 
This is the topic of subsections 2 and 3. 
2. Dominance Results for IR(p)-Curves 
Figure 2a shows the nine estimated ordinates of the post-tax income 
redistribution curves before the reform.
30 None of the three IR(p)-curves changes 
sign. This provides us with a dominance result, and hence a generalisation of the 
results obtained in subsection 1. Besides the specific aggregation implicit for 
Reynolds–Smolensky and Kakwani indices, the conclusion of a positive 
redistributive effect for PIT and a negative one for indirect taxes would result for 
any other aggregation procedure with positive weights at each quantile share.
31 
Moreover, we can always reject the hypothesis that the curves as a whole are 
equal to zero.
32 
The estimated IR(p)-curves after the reform lead to the same conclusion. 
Moreover, the post-reform curves always lie below their pre-reform counterparts. 
Since the difference between the pre- and post-reform curves is too small to be 
visible in the same graph, we have chosen to present, in Figure 2b, the difference 
() ()
AB IR p IR p − . 
Take the case of PIT first. At each p-quantile, the curve in Figure 2b is 
negative. This means that, throughout the whole income range, less post-tax   
 
                                                                                                                                    
30The numbers underlying Figures 2a and 2b can be found in Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix. 
31See Duclos (1993). 
32The detailed test results are given in columns 4, 8 and 12 of Table A.1 in the Appendix. Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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FIGURE 2a 
IR(p)-Values before the Reform 
 
FIGURE 2b 
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income is redistributed from top to bottom by PIT after the reform. One can say 
that the redistributive power of PIT decreased at all income levels. Hence also 
the change in the Reynolds–Smolensky measures, described in subsection 1, can 
be generalised on the basis of this dominance result. But the statistical test of 
()
B IR p  being not significantly different from  ( )
A IR p  at all points cannot be 
rejected. The reason is a non-rejection at the four highest p-quantiles.
33 Testing a 
similar hypothesis over the bottom half of the distribution, the hypothesis that 
()
B IR p  is not significantly different from  ( )
A IR p  can be rejected.
34 Hence 
there is evidence to say that there has been a significant decrease in the 
redistributive impact of PIT in the bottom half of the distribution. 
The kink in the curve that plots the change in  ( ) IR p  at the point p = 0.8 
might be somewhat startling. Yet, if one realises that the reform was also 
correlated with non-income characteristics, non-monotonicity should not come 
as a surprise. One explanation, arising from a detailed analysis of the eighth 
decile, is the fact that the share of married couples is lower in this decile than in 
the surrounding ones. 
For indirect taxes, the curve in Figure 2b lies under the horizontal axis 
everywhere. The overall statistical test reveals that the curve is statistically 
different from zero. Hence one can safely say that the redistribution from bottom 
to top by indirect taxes has been enhanced by the reform. Accordingly, the curve 
for the combined tax system reveals a diminished redistributive effect. Once 
again, the overall test of the curve being equal to zero cannot be rejected. In this 
case, the non-rejection occurs at the three highest p-quantiles. The remaining 
part of the curve is found to be significantly different from zero. 
In Decoster and Van Camp (2000b), we showed that the reranking measure 
defined here in footnote 20 was not significantly different from zero. Therefore, 
as far as inequality reduction is concerned, we tend to evaluate the PIT as well as 
the indirect tax reform, and consequently the joint tax reform, negatively. With a 
fixed distribution of pre-tax income, post-tax income is distributed more 
unequally than before the reform. 
3. Dominance Results for TR(p)-Curves 
As far as liability progression is concerned, the same line of reasoning can be 
followed to generalise the conclusions based on the Kakwani index. Figure 3a 
shows the TR(p)-curves for PIT, indirect taxes and the combined system before  
 
                                                                                                                                    
33See column 4 of Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
34The critical values for a two-sided test with α  = 0.05 and five and six sub null hypotheses are 2.58 and 2.64 
respectively. See Seber (1977, p. 131, Table 5.1). Personal Income Taxes to Indirect Taxes 
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FIGURE 3a 
TR(p)-Values before the Reform 
 
FIGURE 3b 
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the reform.
35 Both before and after the reform (again, we do not show the post-
reform curves), the curves are significantly different from zero. Hence, 
independently of the index used, the PIT system is progressive. At all income 
levels, part of the tax burden is shifted from bottom to top, when compared with 
a counterfactual proportional personal income tax. For indirect taxes, the reverse 
is the case. Lower deciles face higher tax liabilities than they would with 
proportional indirect taxes. Indirect taxes are regressive. 
Figure 3b shows the change in TR(p) caused by the reform. The TR(p)-curve 
after the PIT reform lies entirely above the one before the reform. The 
hypothesis that the before- and after-reform curves are similar is rejected. 
Therefore all liability progression measures will indicate a significant increase in 
the liability progression of the PIT system due to the reform. Also, the TR(p)-
curve of the reformed indirect tax system is entirely dominated by the one before 
the reform. But these curves do not differ significantly from each other at each 
point. Non-rejections are observed for the two highest p-quantiles. However, the 
remaining parts of these curves differ from each other significantly.
36 Hence 
most indices would indicate a significant increase in the liability regressivity of 
the indirect tax system because of the reform. 
Only for the combined system do we not find a dominance result as far as 
liability progression is concerned. For the bottom decile, the combined liability 
progression of PIT and indirect taxes decreases. This means that, after the 
reform, the bottom decile shifts a smaller share of the total tax burden to the top 
than it did before the reform. At all higher estimated points, liability progression 
increases. Hence only an index that gives a very high weight to the bottom decile 
can indicate that liability progressivity has gone down because of the tax reform. 
But, again, we cannot reject at each point the hypothesis that the before- and 
after-reform curves are similar. Non-rejections are observed for the first two and 
the last two points. A similar null hypothesis of no change, applied on the part of 
the curve in between these rejected points, is rejected. Hence, after the reform, 
the ordinate estimates of the TR(p)-curve differ from each other significantly. 
Moreover, these ordinate TR(p)-values are always higher after the reform. 
Therefore, if these significance results are taken into account in the form of zero 
estimates at the rejected points, aggregate liability measures will indicate that the 
reform either has not changed the liability progression of the combined tax 
system or has increased it. 
                                                                                                                                    
35The numbers underlying Figures 3a and 3b can be found in Tables A.3 and A.4 of the Appendix. 
36The critical value for a two-sided test with α  = 0.05 and seven sub null hypotheses is 2.69. See Seber (1977, 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We have evaluated the differences between the Belgian personal income tax and 
indirect tax systems of 1988 and 1993. Within this period, both the PIT system 
and the indirect tax system have been reformed considerably. The PIT reform 
was very much in line with what happened in other OECD countries. The tax 
base was broadened, top rates were reduced and the system moved away from 
joint taxation of married couples in the direction of individual taxation. The 
indirect tax reform discarded the rates of 17, 25 and 33 per cent and increased 
the 19 per cent rate to 19.5 per cent. Excises on fuels and tobacco products were 
increased. As a consequence, less revenue was collected via the PIT system, 
while indirect tax revenue increased. Since the cut in PIT was quantitatively 
more important than the increase in indirect taxes, overall revenue decreased. 
To evaluate the joint impact of these reforms, the tax liabilities of both 
systems have been simulated on micro-datasets. For each tax system, we have 
compared the distribution of equivalised pre-tax income with the distributions of 
equivalised post-tax income and equivalised tax liabilities. These comparisons 
have been summarised both with indices and with Lorenz and concentration 
curves. We have applied recently developed statistical tools to test whether the 
indices and curves are significantly different from zero. Our conclusions are the 
following: 
•  The positive redistributive impact of the PIT system has been eroded by the 
tax reform. The negative redistributive impact of the indirect tax system has 
increased. For the joint tax system, this implies that the redistributive impact 
has also decreased. 
•  These conclusions about the change in the redistributive effect are fairly 
general. Estimates of the relevant Lorenz and concentration curves at nine 
points show that the systems before the reform always dominate those after 
the reform in terms of the redistributive impact. 
•  Not all before- and after-reform IR(p)-curves differ from each other 
significantly over the entire p-range, but they differ significantly over at least 
certain ranges of the distribution. Hence indices would, at best, indicate a 
status quo or else a reduction in the redistributive impact of the respective tax 
systems. 
•  The reduction in the redistributive effect of the combined tax system is 
mainly due to the negative impact of the reform of both PIT and indirect taxes 
at the bottom end of the distribution. With pre-tax income fixed, and given 
the change in average tax rates because of the reform, the bottom three 
deciles are the losers from the reform. The middle income classes are 
relatively unaffected. The top two deciles are the winners from the reform. 
•  The PIT reform has increased the liability progression of the PIT system. The 
liability regressivity of indirect taxes has been enhanced by the reform. Since Fiscal Studies 
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the PIT effect largely dominates the effect of indirect taxes, the liability 
progression of the combined tax system has also increased. 
•  Again, these conclusions are fairly general. In the case of PIT and indirect 
taxes, we obtain dominance results. For the combined tax system, there is no 
dominance. The liability progression decreases for the first decile but this 
effect is cancelled out by the increase in liability progression for all the other 
deciles. Yet the point at which the violation is observed is not estimated as 
significant. The before- and after-reform curves of each system differ 
significantly over a considerable range of the distribution. 
•  The reform has reduced the power of the combined tax system to narrow 
post-tax income inequality. Although this reduction is due to both a decrease 
of the positive redistributive effect of PIT and an increase of the negative 
redistributive effect of indirect taxes, it occurs for different reasons in each 
system. Since PIT has become more progressive, the decline in the 
redistributive effect is entirely due to the lower average tax rate. For indirect 
taxes, increasing liability regressivity and an increasing average tax rate work 
together to affect the inequality of post-tax incomes adversely. 
It probably does not come as a surprise that indirect taxes became more 
regressive after the reform. The highest VAT rates were discarded and excises 
were increased. But the observations about the PIT reform are more intriguing. 
Despite the reduction of the top rates and the move in the direction of more 
individual taxation, liability progression increased. This issue can only be 
elucidated by proceeding through the different stages of the PIT process before 
and after the reform. In Decoster et al. (2000), we sketch the contributions made 
by deductions, tax rates and tax credits to the final redistribution of tax liabilities 
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